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Newsperson's Privilege in California: The
Controversy and Resolution
Introduction
Discussion of the role of freedom of the press has rarely occur-
red without controversy. One of the earliest controversies centered
around the lack of any guarantee of press freedom in the body of the
United States Constitution. This omission reflected the position of
Alexander Hamilton that freedom of the press depended upon and
would fluctuate with public opinion.1 The absence of such freedom
was condemned by the states, however, and on December 15, 1791,
the first amendment was passed, resolving this particular controversy. 2
Another controversy with early beginnings has not been resolved
as expeditiously. As early as an 1848 congressional hearing, contempt
citations were threatened against a newsman when he resisted a com-
mittee request to reveal his sources for a particular story.3 Recent
developments have clarified some of the parameters of the newsper-
son's privilege to keep confidential sources and information concerning
a criminal proceeding. For example, under the United States Supreme
Court decision in Branzburg v. Hayes4 and its progeny, the first amend-
ment rights of newspersons in gathering news relevant to the commis-
sion of crimes have been limited. More recently, the California Court
of Appeal has held that Evidence Code section 10705 will not shield
newspersons from contempt citations if they have interfered with the
criminal judicial process. 6 The federal courts in California have de-
clined to apply section 1070 in federal question cases but rather have
1. W. HACHTEN, THE SUPREME COURT ON FEEomO OF TH= PREss 41-43 (1968).
See generally Z. CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH iN THE UN=TE STATES (1946).
2. W. HAcHTEN, THE SuPR~mm COURT ON FEEOom OF Tm PREss 41-43 (1968).
3. Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (D.C. Cir. 1848). One commentator has
identified this case as the earliest reported one. Note, The Newsman's Privilege after
Branzburg: The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 160, 161 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Newsman's Privilege]. Whether Nugent ever revealed his source
is unclear. Id. at 162.
4. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
5. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1976).
6. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (5th Dist.
1975), hearing denied, Nov. 20, 1975, cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Farr v. Su-
perior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (2d Dist. 1971), hearing denied,
March 20, 1972, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
[375]
allowed the United States Attorney General's guidelines7 to provide
additional protection.
The result in California has been an uneasy truce. Interviews
with a selected number of judges, newspersons, and attorneys have
revealed that neither the judiciary nor newspersons seem to be com-
pletely satisfied with the developments that have resulted from recent
legislative and judicial action. They disagree, if not only upon their
respective roles, at least on the relative values of their roles. The
resulting fair trial-free press controversy remains unresolved, although
ad hoc approaches to a solution are being attempted. The strength
of the public's interest in both fair trial and free press requires, however,
that there be a definitive resolution to this controversy: a federal shield
bill, the impact of which will be illustrated in the context of three
recent California decisions.
History
Regrettably, attention has focused upon the struggle between the
bench and the press over the court's authority to inquire into a news-
person's confidential sources primarily when a clash between the two
has developed and not when there has been time for calm reflection.
8
The clashes have been particularly intense because of the seriousness
of the competing interests involved. Protection for a newsperson's
confidential sources is highly valued as a component of freedom of
the press, which is considered "essential to the nature of a free state."9
In conflict with this interest have been the need for information by
law enforcement officials and by grand juries in conducting investiga-
tions,'" the legislatures' desire for data when studying proposed legis-
7. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1976).
8. For example, Evidence Code § 1070 was originally passed after a series of
cases in the 1930's in which reporters were jailed for contempt. See Note, The Right
of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REv.
61, 71 (1950). Another amendment to Evidence Code § 1070 took place after the
decision in Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (2d Dist.
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
9. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 15-88 (London 1969). See Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931); P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 63 (7th ed. 1972). See generally V. ROYSTER, THE AMERICAN PRESS AND REV-
OLUTIONARY TRADITION (1974).
10. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Burdick v. United States,
236 U.S. 79 (1915); Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va.
755, 204 S.E.2d 429 (1974), State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974).
For recent discussions of all such cases see Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the De-
veloping Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Goodale]; Newsman's Privilege, supra note 3, at 176-78.
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lation or investigating legislative improprieties," and the judiciary's
responsibility to ensure fair trials. 12
Because the common law did not recognize that confidential com-
munications between a newsperson and his source warrant special
protection,'" other bases for the provision of protection have been
sought. State legislatures slowly began to create special laws, known
as shield laws, to provide protection for newspersons. In 1896 Mary-
land became the first state to grant statutory protection to reporters.' 4
Not for another thirty-nine years did a second state follow suit.' 5
Presently, there are twenty-five states that have passed shield laws,'0
11. See, e.g., Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (D.C. Cir. 1848); Ex parte Law-
rence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897). See generally, Note, The Power of Congress
to Investigate and to Compel Testimony, 70 Hnv. L. REv. 671 (1957); Newsman's
Privilege, supra note 3, at 181-82.
12. For cases involving the sixth amendment, see, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966); Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427
(5th Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1st Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
For cases involving the fifth amendment, see, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc.,
66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
13. 8 J. WiMoRE, EvmENcE § 2286 (3rd ed. 1940).
14. AmmucAN ENTxrmnisE INsTrruTrE, NEwsmEN's PmvmEGE LEGISLATION 5 (2d
rev. ed. 1975). Both Iowa and Utah had rejected these privileges before 1896. Pick-
erell, Newsmen's Shield Laws and Subpoenas - California's Farr and The Fresno Four
(unpublished article at Communications & Entertainment Law Journal, Hastings College
of the Law) [hereinafter cited as Pickerell].
15. AMmxcAN ENTERPRSE INsTITUTE, NEwSmEN's PRIVILEGE LEGIsLAION 5 (2d
rev. ed. 1975).
16. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (1976); Am. R.1E.
STAT. § 12.2237 (Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL. Evm. CODE
§ 1070 (West Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 4320-26 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
51, §§ 111-19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IND. CODE: § 34-3-5-1 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REv.
STAT. § 421.100 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.1451-54 (West Supp. 1977); MD.
CTS. & JuD. Pnoc. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974); MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (1972);
MwNN. STAT. §§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-701-
4(8) (Cum. Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1974); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 49.275 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21,-29 (West Supp. 1976); N.Y. Civ.
IicTrrs LAw § 79-h (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 31-01 to -06.2 (Supp.
1976); Omro REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (Page Supp. 1976); ORA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 385.1 (West Supp. 1976); ORE. EVv. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 28, § 330 (Purdon Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (Supp. 1975);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-113 (Supp. 1975). Recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court
declared that state's shield law unconstitutional. The court held that the legislature
lacked the power to prescribe a rule of evidence for the judiciary. Ammerman v. Hub-
bard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
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but the degree of protection afforded under them varies among the
states.17
The judiciary has hesitated to create a privilege in the absence
of state legislative action. Thus, in 1897 a California newsman was
held in contempt for his refusal to give information concerning a brib-
ery investigation being conducted by the state senate.1 8  His prospec-
tive testimony was deemed not privileged under any of the testimonial
privileges existing at the time in California. 19 In 1911 a Georgia re-
porter who refused to reveal the source of a news story argued that
to comply would deprive him of liberty and property without due
process of law, cause him to lose his job, and subject him to public
scorn. 20  These claims were rejected by the state court which stated
that a promise not to testify when required to do so in judicial pro-
ceedings is a promise not to obey the law. Such promises will not be
subordinated to the requirements of the law.21  In 1936 a reporter for
the New York American argued by analogy that newspersons should
be accorded the same common law privilege to protect sources that
the state courts had earlier accorded to law officers, judges, and district
attorneys who in performing their professional duties had declined to
reveal informants' identities. 22  The appellate court rejected the argu-
ment for an extension of the common law because testimonial privi-
leges, which did not include a privilege for newspersons, had tended
to be restricted and not expanded so that the ends of justice could
be served. 23  Another newsman asserted a fifth amendment privi-
lege to keep his information or source confidential. 24  This claim was
sustained by the United States Supreme Court.25
Then in 1958 a court faced for the first time the constitutional
claim that a reporter's refusal to reveal a source effectively limits the
availability of news to the public.2 6  The reporter was deposed when
17. See Note, Reporter's Privilege - Guardian of the People's Right to Know? 11
NEw ENCL. L. REV. 405 (1976). See also Hearings on H.R. 717 Before Subcomm. No.
3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 251-358 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Hearings on H.R. 7171.
18. Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897).
19. Id. See also People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 P. 75 (1897) (defendant's
communication to reporter concerning crime was not privileged).
20. Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911).
21. Id. at 71, 70 S.E. at 786.
22. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936).
23. Id. Furthermore, the New York legislature had defeated a proposed privilege
for newspersons in 1936. Id.
24. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
25. Id. The fifth amendment will generally not be available in civil cases because
no criminal act is involved.
26. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958). See generally Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right
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her employer was sued for libel based on a column written by the
reporter. During the deposition the reporter refused to reveal the
source of her story, asserting the first amendment right of freedom
of the press. Justice Stewart, then a justice on the New York Court
of Appeals, noted that freedom of the press had traditionally been
regarded only as freedom from prior restraint or censorship. He stated
that the scope of freedom of the press under the first amendment is,
however, not limited to these particular abridgmentsY He added
that because the first amendment's freedom of speech guarantee is
not absolute, even new extensions of freedom of the press must be
balanced against competing interests, here the need for the reporter's
testimony. The New York court held that freedom of the press in
this situation had to give way to the "paramount public interest in
the fair administration of justice."28  The court noted especially that
such a decision did not necessitate wholesale disclosure of confidential
sources and that the news source appeared to be relevant or material
to the plaintiff's cause of action.29  Thus, while the reporter succeeded
in invoking the first amendment, she lost in the balancing that was
done.
Until 1972 the United States Supreme Court had declined to define
the first amendment protection given to newspersons who refused to
reveal confidential sources in either civil or criminal proceedings . 0
Then, in Branzburg v. Hayes,31 the Court held, based on the record
before it, that when a newsperson who has knowledge of a crime is
called upon to testify before a grand jury, the newsperson's duty to
appear and testify is the same as that of any citizen.3 2  The Branzburg
to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L. J. 317, 326-34 (1970); Freedom of Infor-
mation Center, Columbia, Mo., Newsmen's Sources and the Law (Pub. No. 259, 1971).
27. 259 F.2d at 549.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 549-50. Justice Stewart found that the identity of the source went "to
the heart of the plaintiff's claim." Id. at 550. This decision was the commencement
of extensive litigation concerning the first amendment as a shield for confidential sources.
30. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958); Murphy v. Colorado, No. 19604 (Colo. Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843
(1961); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905
(1968).
31. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (5-4 decision).
32. Id. at 690-91. Branzburg was one of a trilogy of cases that involved reporters
who refused to appear or testify before grand juries investigating criminal activities.
Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Branzburg v. Meigs, 503
S.W.2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971). The second case joined was In re Pappas, 358 Mass.
604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971). The third case joined was Caldwell v. United States,
434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). All three cases involved
reporters who were witnesses to alleged criminal activity and were called upon by the
grand jury to appear and testify.
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decision produced four separate opinions, 33 causing confusion and
debate as to the actual Branzburg holding.3
4
Justice White's plurality opinion emphasized that at common law
there had been no newsperson's privilege to keep sources confiden-
tial.35 Furthermore, the opinion discussed the fact that with only
minor exceptions, modem case law had failed to develop such a privi-
lege.36  The opinion also discounted the effect of subpoenas upon
newsmen.3 7  Perhaps at the heart of Justice White's plurality opinion
was the Justice's fear that acceptance of a qualified newsperson's
privilege would have forced the courts to answer the questions:
Is there probable cause to believe a crime has been committed?
Is it likely that the reporter has useful information gained in con-
fidence? Could the grand jury obtain the information elsewhere?
Is the official interest sufficient to outweigh the claimed privilege?3"
White concluded that this burden would entail the courts' deciding
"between the value of enforcing different criminal laws" and would
necessitate the courts' becoming legislators and making judgments as
to "what conduct is liable to criminal prosecution." 39  Thus, the plu-
rality declined to deprive the legislature of its function.
Another approach to understanding the Branzburg opinion may
lie with the concurrence of Justice Powell. 40  He stated that news-
persons are not entirely without first amendment protection in news
gathering and that a claim of privilege should be subject to a balance
which weighs the freedom of the press against the duty of citizens to
testify as to their knowledge of criminal conduct.41 Justice Powell
further stated that to protect confidential sources, a reporter would
have to show the government's lack of good faith or prove that the
33. Justice White wrote for the plurality of the court. The three justices joining
in his opinion were Justices Burger, Blackmun and Rehnquist. Justice Powell wrote
a concurring opinion. 408 U.S. at 709. Justice Douglas filed a dissent. 408 U.S. at
711. Justice Stewart wrote a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. 408 U.S.
at 725.
34. See generally, Goodale, supra note 10; Note, Newsman - Source Privilege:
A Foundation in Policy for Recognition at Common Law, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 453 (1974);
Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HAnv. L. REv.
1505 (1974); Comment, Newsman's Privilege Against Compulsory Disclosure of Sources
in Civil Suits - Toward an Absolute Privilege? 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 173 (1973); Cades,
The Power of the Courts to Protect Journalists' Confidential Sources of Information: An
Examination of Proposed Shield Legislation, 11 HAw. B.J. 35 (1975).
35. 408 U.S. at 682.
36. Id. at 685.
37. Id. at 659 n.33.
38. Id. at 705.
39. Id. at 706.
40. Id. at 709.
41. Id. at 709-10.
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testimony was only tenuously related to the investigation.4 2  Powell
indicated that the reporters at bench had not satisfied either of these
alternatives.
Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by two other Justices, was critical
of the plurality's demand for empirical evidence regarding newsper-
sons' dependence on confidential sources and the deterrent effect which
may be caused by the subpoena power.43  Justice Stewart's dissent
resembled Justice Powell's concurrence, except that Justice Stewart
chose a three-pronged delineated balancing approach rather than
Powell's undefined balancing of the first and sixth amendments.
Specifically, Stewart would have accepted a qualified privilege based
on a test in which the government would have the burden of showing
that (1) there is probable cause to believe the newsperson possesses
information clearly relevant to the investigation, (2) there are no less
restrictive alternatives for obtaining the .information, and (3) there
is a "compelling and overriding interest in the information."44
Justice Douglas was the only member of the Court to advocate
an absolute privilege for newspersons to decline to reveal information
relevant to a criminal proceeding obtained in news gathering.45 His
rationale was that any attempt at line-drawing eventually would be
"twisted and relaxed so as to provide virtually no protection at all."46
Thus, the Supreme Court in Branzburg held that when a reporter
is involved in criminal activity as a witness or participant, he is offered
no first amendment protection before a grand jury when he refuses
42. Id. at 710.
43. Id. at 733. Two surveys concerning a newsperson's use of confidential sources
supported Justice Stewart's reservations. Blasi, The Newsmanus Privilege: An Empirical
Study, 70 Mica. L. REv. 229 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Blasi]; Guest & Stanzler, The
Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 18
(1969). These studies concluded that confidential sources, although few in number,
have been crucial to the more important news stories and that the trend is towards an
increase in investigative reporting. Therefore, the number of reporters using such con-
fidential sources is not the important index of their value in effective news gathering.
44. 408 U.S. at 743 (1972).
45. Id. at 711.
46. Id. at 720. See, e.g., Newsmer's Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 215 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1975) (statement of Jack Nelson and
Fred Graham of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on H.R. 215]; The Case for a Shield Law, Boston Globe, Jan. 27, 1973,
reprinted in Newsmen's Privilege: Hearings on Bills to Create a Testimonial Privilege
for Newsmen Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on
the judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 598 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings];
A Chilling Effect on the Press, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1972, reprinted in Senate Hearings,
supra at 611; Knight, Shield Laws Can Be Risky - First Amendment Protects Best,
Charlotte Observer, March 18, 1973, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra at 625.
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to reveal his sources. 47 The decision did not address what privilege
would attach to a newsperson under other circumstances. Branzburg
addressed only those issues governed by the federal Constitution and
federal common law. The Court's decision precluded neither Con-
gress nor the state legislatures from creating a newsperson's privilege
nor the state judiciaries from interpreting state constitutions to include
a newsperson's right to keep sources confidential.48
Protection of Newspersons in California
When a newsperson in California wishes to keep news sources
confidential the probability of success in avoiding a contempt citation
is uncertain. In state court the outcome will be governed by Evidence
Code section 1070, 9 the recent judicial decisions in which section 1070
has been construed, °0 and the California and United States Constitu-
tions.--,' Thus far the California courts have chosen not to interpret
the freedom of the press provision of the California Constitution to
allow any greater privilege for newspersons than that presently con-
tained in the federal Constitution, 52 as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Branzburg. 5 3  An additional factor to be considered in federal
court is a set of guidelines prepared by the United States Attorney
General.54
Evidence Code Section 1070
Currently, statutory protection for a newsperson is provided by
Evidence Code section 1070, which states that persons employed by
or connected with a newspaper or magazine publisher or a radio or
television station cannot be adjudged in contempt by any judicial,
legislative, or administrative body for refusal to reveal a confidential
source or unpublished information obtained from such a source. 55
The legislature passed the first California shield law in response to
47. 408 U.S. at 682 (1972). Justice White said, "The sole issue before us is the
obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to
answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime." Id.
48. Id. at 706.
49. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1976).
50. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (5th Dist.
1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 917 (1976); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60,
99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (2d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
51. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2. "No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press."
52. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 215, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 443
(5th Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 917 (1976).
53. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
54. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1976).
55. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1976).
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a series of cases involving reporters and their sources.56 California
added a provision to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1935 that granted
immunity from contempt when newspaper employees refused to dis-
close sources to courts or legislative bodies.57  Then in 1962 the legis-
lature extended this immunity to employees of radio and television
stations, press associations, and wire services.58  Three years later
there was a heated debate over whether an absolute immunity from
contempt was inherent in this privilege. 59 The legislature rejected
the absolute privilege and re-enacted the code section, effecting no
change other than its placement into the Evidence Code as section
1070.60
In 1971 Evidence Code section 1070 was amended to provide
protection for information received by a newsperson who had ceased
to be so employed and to safeguard information that was never pub-
lished.61 Further amendment in 1972 afforded protection in any ad-
ministrative or court proceeding. 62  Finally, in 1974, the California
56. An account of these cases is given in Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain
from Divulging the Source of His Information, 36 VA. L. REv. 61, 71 (1950).
57. 1935 Cal. Stats., ch. 532, at 1608 (formerly codified at Deering, 1937) CAL.
Crv. Pnoc. CODE § 1881(6). It provided: "A publisher, editor, reporter or other person
connected with or employed upon a newspaper can not be adjudged in contempt by a
court, the Legislature, or any administrative body, for refusing to disclose the source
of any information procured for publication and published in a newspaper." See gen-
erally McDonough, California Evidence Code: A Pricis, 18 HASTMNcS L.J. 89 (1966);
Pickerell, supra note 14; Note, Journalists in the Courts: Toward Effective Shield Legis-
lation, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 664, (1974); Comment, Review of Selected 1972 California
Legislation: Criminal Procedure: Newsmen's Immunity from Contempt, 4 PAc. L. J. 387
(1973); Comment, Newsmen's Immunity Needs a Shot in the Arm, 11 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 56 (1970); Note, Newsman's Privilege: A Survey of the Law in California, 4 PAC.
L. J. 880 (1973). For more recent commentary see Comment, The California Approach
to the Yielding of the Newsman's Shield Law, 3 PEPPEwrDNE L. Rv. 313 (1976).
58. 1961 Cal. Stats., ch. 629, § 1, at 1798.
59. 6 Cal. Law Revision Comm., Reports, Recommendations and Studies, A Cali-
fornia Privilege Not Covered by the Uniform Rules - Newsmen's Privilege, 481-508
(1964); see Pickerell, supra note 14.
60. 1965 Cal. Stats., ch. 299, at 1297. The Assembly Committee on the Judiciary
stated that Evidence Code § 1070 was to provide an immunity from contempt and not
a privilege. Other sanctions for a newsperson's refusal to testify as a party in civil
proceedings may still be employed. See CArL. Evi). CoDE § 1070 (West Supp. 1976).
See also Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 216 n.17, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427,
444 (5th Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
61. 1971 Cal. Stats., ch. 1717, at 3658. The decision in Farr v. Superior Court,
22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (2d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011
(1972) could have been decided against Farr on the basis of Evidence Code § 1070
because the statute did not appear to cover former newspersons and Farr was no longer
so employed. However, the court chose not to reach this issue and held against Farr
on other grounds. Id. at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 347-48.
62. 1972 Cal. Stats., ch. 1431, at 3126. Evidence Code § 901 defines proceedings
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legislature amended Evidence Code section 1070 to safeguard un-
published material that can be characterized as background notes or
television or radio "outtakes" 63 and specifically granted immunity to
those employed by magazines and other periodicals.64 With each of
these amendments, the California legislature arguably intended to
create an absolute immunity from contempt citations. If the legisla-
ture intended such immunity, that intent has not been implemented
by the courts; indeed under the courts' separation of powers analysis
the courts could not have abdicated their responsibility for ensuring
fair trials.
Farr v. Superior Court
The court of appeal in Farr v. Superior Court5 rejected a claim
of first amendment protection for confidential news sources, using a
balancing approach similar to that used in Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in the then pending Branzburg case. 6 Yet, the decision's
primary importance lies in the appellate court's interpretation of
Evidence Code section 1070.
Farr was a reporter covering the Manson murder trial when he
obtained three copies of a statement by a potential witness that im-
plicated one or more defendants. The witness had described a con-
fession by one of Manson's codefendants and a list of future victims
of the Manson group. The trial court had issued an order re publi-
city 7 to prevent such potential testimony from being distributed by
officers of the court. Nonetheless, Farr planned to publish a story
based on two copies of the statement from two attorneys of record
and another copy from a source who may or may not have been an
attorney of record.68  He discussed his decision with the trial judge,
broadly to include any action in which testimony can be compelled. CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 901 (West 1966). The 1972 amendment to § 1070 made clear that immunity was
provided before any body which could issue subpoenas as defined by § 901.
63. The term "outtakes" is used by the broadcasting media to refer to those por-
tions recorded but not used on the air.
64. 1974 Cal. Stats., ch. 1456, at 3183. On June 24, 1977, the California Assembly
approved a proposed constitutional amendment that would make Evidence Code § 1070
a part of the California Constitution. The final vote was 54-22. See S.F. Chronicle,
June 25, 1977, at 8, col. 3.
65. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (2d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1011 (1972).
66. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See notes 40-42 & accompanying text supra.
67. This order is an example of a restrictive or "gag" order. It prohibited court
officers, employees, or witnesses from releasing any information for public dissemination
concerning the Manson trial. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344. Farr was
not subject to the order.
68. 22 Cal. 3d at 66, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
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who told Farr that under Evidence Code section 1070 he would be
immune from contempt for the planned publication. 9
In the Manson trial, much of the material Farr had published was
declared inadmissible.70 After the verdict, the same trial court judge
conducted hearings to discover who had violated his order re publi-
city.71 Farr testified that two, and possibly three, attorneys involved
in the Manson trial had supplied his copies of the statement. Farr
refused, however, to name these sources and was held in direct
contempt.72
On appeal, the court reached the threshold issue of whether the
trial court had been without jurisdiction to proceed with its hearing
because the principal action, the trial, had ended before the beginning
of the civil contempt inquiry. The court concluded that there wasjurisdiction because the trial court's inquiry was necessary both to
control its own officers and to perfect the record on appeal. The in-
quiry was relevant because prejudicial publicity was likely to be an
issue on appeal. If counsel for the prosecution had leaked the material
to Farr, press publication of this prejudicial matter might have merited
serious consideration on appeal. On the other hand, if defense coun-
sel had distributed the statement, the situation would have been "ma-
terially different ' 73 and unlikely to constitute prejudice. Because the
hearing was otherwise proper, the court of appeal upheld the trial
court's action and affirmed the contempt citation.74
Farr sought and was denied review of the contempt citation
by the California Supreme Court7 5 and the United States Supreme
Court.76 Meanwhile, the trial court judge attempted to convict Farr
of criminal contempt based on his activities during the Manson trial,
but another judge acquitted him of these charges.77  Farr was ordered
to jail on November 16, 1972,78 and he promptly began unsuccessful
69. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 582, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649, 652 (1974).
70. The material was not inadmissible because of the Farr publication on Oct. 9,
1971. The jury had been sequestered from the beginning of the trial. The night
before publication Farr telephoned trial Judge Older to ask him to blacken the windows
of the bus transporting the jurors. Telephone interview with Mark Hurwitz, attorney
for William Farr, in Los Angeles (June 1, 1977).
71. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 65, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
72. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 66, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 345. Direct contempt is wilful dis-
regard or disobedience committed in the presence of the court. Bouvmi's LAw Dyc-
TiONARY 651 (8th ed. 1914).
73. Id. at 68, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
74. Id.
75. The California Supreme Court refused a hearing on March 20, 1972.
76. 409 U.S. 1011 (1972). See Brief for Appellant at 6, Farr v. Pitchess, 522
F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Farr Brief].
77. Farr Brief supra note 76 at 6.
78. Id.
habeas corpus proceedings in the California state courts.7 9  He was
confined in jail for forty-five days"° after the United States District
Court denied his petition for habeas corpus. 81  He next petitioned the
United States Supreme Court, and Justice William 0. Douglas released
him pending review in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.8 2  While
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had his writ under consideration,
Farr protested his indeterminate sentence for civil contempt.8 3 Even
though the court of appeal held that Farr's sentence was neither cruel
nor unusual, it directed that a hearing be held in the superior court
to determine whether there was a substantial likelihood that the con-
tempt commitment would serve its coercive purpose.8 4  On remand,
the lower court found Farr's sentence no longer coercive and ordered
Farr released. The original trial judge next conducted a hearing on
criminal contempt charges and imposed the maximum punitive sen-
tence based on Farr's nondisclosure of his sources.8 5  The Ninth Cir-
cuit then denied Farr's writ of habeas corpus and refused rehearing. 86
Thereafter, the California Court of Appeal reviewed the punitive
sentence imposed on Farr by the trial judge and determined that
Farr's former acquittal of criminal contempt for the same act in 1971
barred this punitive sentence.8 7  Finally, after more than five years
of struggle, Farr's day in court came to an end.88
The holding of Farr v. Superior Court89 definitively excludes from
Evidence Code section 1070 any provision for an absolute immunity.
The court in this first Farr opinion held that if the legislature had
attempted to provide an absolute immunity, it would have contravened
the judiciary's role in ensuring fair trials and thus would have consti-
tuted a violation of the separation of powers. 90  The court indicated
that the certainty of the involvement of two court officers necessitated
its inquiry.9 1
79. Id.
80. In re Farr, 64 Cal. App. 3d 605, 611, 134 Cal. Rptr. 595, 598 (2d Dist. 1976).
81. Farr Brief supra note 76 at 6-7.
82. 409 U.S. 1243 (1973).
83. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (2d Dist. 1974).
84. Id. at 584, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
85. In re Farr, 64 Cal. App. 3d 605, 612, 134 Cal. Rptr. 595, 598 (2d Dist. 1976).
86. Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975).
87. In re Farr, 64 Cal. App. 3d 605, 612, 134 Cal. Rptr. 595, 599. This decision
was based on CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West Supp. 1977).
88. Farr commented that the total cost was over $100,000. Interview with William
Farr, reporter, L.A. Times, in Los Angeles (July 22, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Farr
interview].
89. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (2d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1011 (1972).
90. Id. at 69-70, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
91. See id. at 71 n.5, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 349. Justice Franson, concurring and dis-
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An alternative basis for Farr's claim to protect his sources was
the first amendment. The appellate court upheld the trial court in
this regard without awaiting the Branzburg decision, which was on
appeal.9 2  The court distinguished Branzburg because the inquiry in
Farr involved a violation of a court order and not, as in Branzburg,
the refusal to reveal to a grand jury sources of information relevant to
criminal activity.9 3 -Therefore, the appellate court proceeded to apply
the balancing test and to weigh first amendment rights Farr raised
against the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial.0 4 It
found that the Supreme Court's holding in Sheppard v. Maxwell95
encouraged the use of such orders to protect criminal defendants from
prejudicial matter and required that a court control its officers to
provide a fair trial for the defendant.96
After Farr, immunity from contempt under Evidence Code section
1070 exists only if the court finds that refusal to reveal the identity of
a confidential source will not interfere with its duty to administer
justice. In addition, if a first amendment claim is raised, it will
trigger judicial weighing of the competing interests involved.
senting in Rosato v. Superior Court, thought that Farr had waived immunity. 51 Cal.
App. 3d 190, 233, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 461 (5th Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976).
92. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 72, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
93. Id.
94. The balancing approach in Farr resembled the balancing test of Justice Powell
in his Branzburg concurrence. The state court stated: "Balancing, as we are required
to do, the interest to be served by disclosure of source against its potential inhibition
upon the free flow of information, we conclude that petitioner is not privileged by the
First Amendment to refuse to answer the questions put to him in the trial court." 22
Cal. App. 3d at 73, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 350. In Branzburg, Justice Powell said: "The as-
serted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance
between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony
with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal
interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudi-
cating such questions." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972).
95. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). For cases dealing with the balancing process in weigh-
ing the first and sixth amendments, see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau
v. Lousiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Stroble
v. California, 343 U.S. 532 (1952). See Comment, Gagging the Press in Criminal
Trials, 10 HAav. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 608 (1975); Note, Gag Orders on Criminal Defen-
dants, 27 HAsnrNcs L.J. 1369 (1976); Note, Prejudicial Publicity in Trials of Public
Officials, 85 YALE L.J. 123 (1975). See generally Warren & Abell, Free Press - Fair
Trial: The "Gag Order," a California Aberration, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 51 (1972); Note,
Judicial Control of Pretridl and Trial Publicity: A Reexamination of the Applicable Con-
stitutional Standards, 6 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 101 (1975).
96. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 73, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
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Rosato v. Superior Court
Prior to the final disposition in Farr, a case involving four news-
men in Fresno, California who published information from a sealed
grand jury transcript became a cause cglebre. In Rosato v. Superior
Court,97 the California Court of Appeal had an opportunity after
Branzburg to face squarely a defense based both upon Evidence Code
section 1070 and the first amendment. 98
Rosato, a reporter for the Fresno Bee, obtained a copy of a sealed
grand jury transcript after the grand jury had indicted a councilman,
a land developer, and the former city planning commissioner on counts
of bribery and conspiracy. 99 Although Rosato had a copy of the sealed
transcript a month before publication, he did not publish excerpts from
the transcript until the latter two under investigation had been granted
changes in venue. 100 The councilman's criminal trial was not trans-
ferred from Fresno.101 In determining whether to publish the tran-
script, Rosato discussed its contents with his managing editor, the city
editor, and another reporter. 102  These newsmen decided to publish
excerpts of the sealed transcript because they determined that the
public had a right to know about possible graft involving the city
council and because the information was not different from that al-
ready published before the grand jury began its proceedings. 10 3
After the Bee's publication of the transcript, the court began
proceedings to determine who had violated its order sealing the tran-
script.' 04  Each of the newsmen except the city editor testified that
he did not obtain the transcript from a person subject to the order.105
However, Rosato refused to reveal whether he had obtained the tran-
script from a person subject to the court order without that person's
knowledge or consent. Further, he refused to testify whether it had
been taken from the office of a court officer by an agent or employee
of McClatchy Newspapers.'
The court examined thirteen court officers who had lawful access
97. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (5th Dist. 1975), hearing denied,
Nov. 20, 1975, cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
98. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 199, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 432-33.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 201, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
101. Id.
102. Interview with George Gruner, Editor, Fresno Bee, in Fresno (July 20, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Gruner interview].
103. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 239, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 465. (Franson, J., concurring and
dissenting).
104. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 201, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
105. The city editor claimed he had no knowledge about how the transcript was
obtained. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 203, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
106. Id. The Fresno Bee is owned by McClatchy Newspapers.
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to the transcript. Each denied being the source of Rosato's story.10 7
Despite the newsman's earlier denials of obtaining the transcript from
any person subject to the order, the court questioned them further. 08
Although the court's inquiry did not reveal that its order had in fact
been violated by a court officer, the questions were nonetheless per-
tinent to the inquiry. The newsmen could, therefore, have been prop-
erly compelled to answer them because "[t]he court is not required to
believe witnesses."o9
The court's decision in Rosato dispelled any belief that without a
newsperson's admission of involvement by court officers in a violation
of a court's order there was no waiver of immunity under Evidence
Code section 1070. A court may proceed with its inquiry even if it is
given no cause to believe a person subject to a court's restrictive order
was guilty of violation of that order. The court may continue its in-
quiry if it only suspects there has been a violation of a restrictive order
by court officers.110 In addressing the first amendment claim raised
in the case, the court of appeal reviewed the Branzburg decision and
said that "the fair trial guarantee to criminal defendants ... is certainly
entitled to equal, if not greater, protection than criminal investigations
by grand juries .... "1 Therefore, the rationale in Branzburg was
applied to make "the right to require such testimony in an investigation
growing out of the violation of an order which goes to the right of a
criminal defendant to a fair trial ... irrefutable."" 2  When the in-
terests were balanced, the court concluded that "the right to a fair
trial outweighed the conditional First Amendment right to refuse to
disclose sources." 113
107. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 202, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
108. Rosato and the other reporter admitted to having keys to the courthouse and
various offices within the building but testified they had not used these to gain access
to the transcript. Id. at 204, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
109. Id. at 224, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
110. Id. at 225, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 451. However, the Rosato dissent stated: "Ob-
viously, connivance or collusion on the part of a court officer would be pertinent because
it would show a knowing violation of the order; however, mere carelessness, indiffer-
ence, or neglect, while perhaps tangentially relevant in that it indicates an absence of
intentional wrongdoing by a court officer, nonetheless is within the privilege because
it also might endanger a protected source." Id. at 234, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 461. The
court also held that Evidence Code § 1070 extended to disclosure of information in any
form. Id. at 218, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 445. Additionally, the court stated that distinguish-
ing Evidence Code § 1070 as an immunity or privilege was unnecessary because it was
at least a privilege to be protected from contempt citations. Id. at 216 n.17, 124 Cal.
Rptr. at 444. The Fresno Bee newsmen were incarcerated for 15 days. S.F. Chronicle,
Sept. 21, 1976, at 34, col. 1.
111. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 213, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 215, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
Importantly, the California Court of Appeal rejected the three-
pronged test that was espoused by Justice Stewart in his Branzburg
dissent" 4 and that arguably was supported by Justice Powell in his
concurring opinion.115 The court of appeal decided that before a
hearing begins to determine which court officers violated its order,
the trial court should balance the importance of the defendant's right
to a fair trial and the integrity of court processes in relation to the
limited right of a newsperson not to disclose sources. In this case, the
trial court was correct in going forward with such a hearing to perfect
the record on appeal by determining which court officers had violated
the court order. No balancing need take place at this hearing.' 1 6
Subsequent to Rosato, it appears that newspersons in California
who publish material that is under a court's protective order are not
protected by Evidence Code section 1070, the California Constitution,
or the first amendment of the United States Constitution. The recent
United States Supreme Court decision in Nebraska Press Association
v. Stuart" 7 does not alter this conclusion, although it held that any
prior restraints upon the press are under a heavy presumption of un-
constitutionality. 1 8  Nebraska Press involved prior restraint in the
form of a direct order to the press restricting publicity in a sensational
murder case." 9 Juxtaposing Nebraska Press with the refusal of the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari in either Farr120 or Rosato' 21 reveals
that although the press can seldom be told directly by the court not
to publish information it obtains concerning a trial or judicial inquiry,
if the press publishes information that was obtained or may have been
obtained from a source under a court's restrictive order, a newsperson
will have to divulge his or her source or face contempt charges. This
distinction limits newspersons in gathering news about criminal trials
114. Id. at 216, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 444. See note 43 & accompanying text supra.
115. See notes 40-43 & accompanying text supra. See generally Goodale, supra note
10.
116. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 214 n.13, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 443. The court said: "As has
been stated, when the court decided to go forward with the hearings, it recognized the
seriousness of the violation of its orders designed to preserve and protect the right to
a fair trial and the integrity of the court processes so necessary to guarantee that right
in relation to the limited First Amendment right not to disclose. Having done that
and properly decided under the law and the facts of this case that there was no First
Amendment privilege, the balancing process was at an end." Id.
117. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
118. See Note, Ungagging the Press: Expedited Relief from Prior Restraints on News
Coverage of Criminal Proceedings, 65 GEO. L.J. 81 (1976).
119. 427 U.S. 539, 542 (1976).
120. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (2d Dist. 1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
121. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (5th Dist.
1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
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because of the chilling effect on them caused by exposure to contempt
citations, litigation costs, and jail terms.
Newsperson's Protection in Federal Court in California
Newspersons in California may become entangled with the federal
courts if a source has been involved in a federal offense. In such a
case, when the newsperson is subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury
or is subpoenaed by a United States attorney in a criminal trial, the
United States Attorney General's guidelines 122 apply. Under these
guidelines newspersons are administratively afforded some protection
when a subpoena is issued.
The Attorney General's guidelines limit the Justice Department's
attorneys when they contemplate subpoenaeing newspersons. The
guidelines provide that before the issuance of a subpoena, the gov-
ernment must seek alternative sources, possess information showing
a crime has in fact occurred, and ascertain that the information is
necessary to a successful investigation. Specific authorization from
the Attorney General must be obtained before a subpoena is issued.
Except in "exigent circumstances," subpoenas to newspersons should
be issued only to verify the accuracy of a published report. In addi-
tion, harassment must be avoided. Furthermore, if possible, the sub-
poena should be limited in scope.123 However, there is no burden
upon the government to show compliance with these guidelines.124
The Department of Justice reported that from March 1, 1973, to
May 8, 1975, there were fifty-four requests approved for subpoenas of
newspersons; in forty-two of these the newspersons had previously re-
fused to comply with the government's request unless a subpoena was
first issued.' 25  The department claims that only one of the subpoenas
involved was an attempt to ascertain a confidential source.126  How-
ever, these figures indicate that a number of newspersons who at first
would not accede to the request may comply with a subpoena rather
than expend the time or money involved in litigation.
The use of the Attorney General's guidelines is illustrated in Lewis
v. United States.127  In Lewis, the general manager of a radio station
122. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1976).
123. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1976); Hearings on H.R. 215, supra note 46, at 12 (testi-
mony of Antonin Scalia).
124. In re Lewis, 384 F. Supp. 133, 137 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
125. Hearings on H.R. 215, supra note 46, at 33-34.
126. The Memorandum issued by the Department of Justice on May 23, 1975 ex-
cludes from the category of confidential sources 'letters from extremist organizations,
received without solicitation, claiming credit for criminal acts.... . Hearings on H.R.
215, supra note 46, at 35. A complete list and description of these subpoenas is found
in Hearings on H.R. 215, supra note 46, at 37-93.
127. 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975).
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was held in civil contempt for refusing to comply with a federal grand
jury subpoena duces tecum for an original communique that admitted
a bombing and allegedly came from an underground group. 128 Lewis
on two prior occasions had received communications allegedly from
radical groups in which they claimed credit for acts which constituted
federal crimes. 129  Lewis defended his right not to disclose the infor-
mation based upon the Attorney General's guidelines, Evidence Code
section 1070, and the first amendment. 130
The appellate court in Lewis held that there had been no proce-
dural deficiency because the Justice Department had complied with
the Attorney General's guidelines. The court reviewed the depart-
ment's exercise of discretion under the guidelines assuming that Lewis
had standing to raise the issue of government noncompliance with
the guidelines.'3' Specifically, the court upheld the department's de-
termination that exigent circumstances existed that justified inquiry
beyond mere verification of the communique's contents because the
bombing was a serious offense and other evidence was not available. 132
Under these facts Lewis was afforded no protection by the At-
torney General's guidelines and, significantly, none under Evidence
Code section 1070. The court held section 1070 inapplicable, even
under then proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 501.133 This rule,
subsequently adopted in 1975,13 provides in pertinent part that if
federal law is applied in a case, the courts are to interpret the common
law privileges "in the light of reason and experience."135  The appel-
late court in Lewis held that in a federal question case the court may
consider state privilege law but that "the rule ultimately adopted,
whatever its substance, is not state law but federal common law. 136
The court's interpretation seems inconsistent with the statement of the
principal draftsman of the rule that the purpose of the rule was not to
"freeze the law of privilege" but rather to permit the courts "to develop
a privilege for newspaper persons on a case-by-case basis." 137 Not-
128. Id. at 237.
129. Lewis v. United States, 501 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 913 (1975).
130. 517 F.2d at 237-38.
131. 517 F.2d at 238. It is questionable whether Lewis has standing to raise the
issue because the Attorney General's guidelines govern only Justice Department action
and are subject to change at the Attorney General's whim.
132. Id. at 238-39.
133. Id. at 237. The court held that § 501 codified the then existing law and
stated that in federal question cases, in the absence of a federal statute, the law applied
is federal common law. Id.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 501 (1975).
135. Id.
136. 517 F.2d at 237.
137. 120 CONG. REC. H12,254 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Hungate).
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withstanding this divergence, the Ninth Circuit appears to have chosen
not to develop a newsperson's privilege in federal question cases under
rule 501, at least not upon the facts as presented by Lewis.
Third, as to Lewis' claim that a qualified first amendment privilege
survived Branzburg, the Ninth Circuit held that if the investigation
had been conducted in good faith, if no harassment could be shown
and if the information was directly related to the investigation, there
was no protection under either the plurality opinion of Justice White
or the concurring opinion of Justice Powell. The court held that the
defendant Lewis had failed to show any of these factors.138
In conclusion, although the Attorney General's guidelines seem
to create a qualified privilege reminiscent of the dissent by Justice
Stewart in Branzburg,3 9 under them the United States attorney and
ultimately the Attorney General decides whether the guidelines have
been followed.' 40  The court may later assess whether the judgment
of the Attorney General was correct or whether harassment or bad
faith existed.' 41 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal may
not apply Evidence Code section 1070 in federal question cases under
rule 501. Third, a newsperson asserting a qualified first amendment
privilege must show bad faith, harassment or a tenuous relationship
between his information and the investigation.
A newsperson should be aware of the defenses which will be
available in federal and state courts when asked to reveal a source or
information. Uncertainty is created by the judicial interpretations of
Evidence Code section 1070 in contempt proceedings and of the first
amendment privilege to withhold news sources or information after
Branzburg.142
Prevailing Attitudes
The current problems in California between the bench and the
press are accompanied by dissatisfaction on both sides. Among mem-
138. 517 F.2d at 239.
139. 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972).
140. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1976).
141. Although there is no burden upon the government to show adherence to the
guidelines, the appellate court in both Lewis cases assumed for purposes of argument
that Lewis had standing to seek court review of these interdepartmental guidelines.
Lewis v. United States, 501 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913
(1975); Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1975).
142. Professor Blasi found a decrease in uncertainty at the time he conducted his
empirical survey. He states: "The Caldwell decision, for example, has had a remarkable
effect in 'clearing the air', despite the fact that the court's holding was sharply qualified.
The exception-riddled guidelines that were handed down by the Attorney General in the
aftermath of the furor over the Caldwell subpoena have also had a surprisingly salutary
effect." Blasi, supra note 43 at 281-82 (discussing Caldwell v. United States, 408 U.S.
bers of the press are some newspersons who are unaware of their po-
tential vulnerability when they seek to honor a pledge of nondisclosure
to a confidential source. 143  The informed members of the press gener-
ally seem critical of the courts' balancing process when the defendant's
right to a fair trial is an issue and of the role the press is expected to
assume in investigative hearings. Moreover, they warn of the chilling
effect on investigative reporting, which they believe is vital to the
public's need to be informed about important and often sensitive issues
and on the economic health and continued existence of newspapers.
The bench, on the other hand, is sensitive to the criticism aimed at it,
which it basically considers unjustified.144
The Press
Press criticism of the judiciary's impact on newsperson's privilege
regarding confidential sources has been multidirectional. Some mem-
bers of the press view the issuance of subpoenas and gag orders as an
infringement on their rights as journalists145 and therefore do not agree
665 (1972) (Branzburg companion case)). This survey result may no longer be valid
because the Caldwell decision in favor of a privilege was overturned. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
143. Blasi states: "The lack of awareness of these [shield] statutes is remarkable....
Of the 421 respondents in our survey who listed one of the shield law states as the
state in which they do most of their work, only 149 (35.4%) were able to say with
certainty that their state has a statutory privilege for newspersons; 211 (50.1%) said,
"I'm not certain,' and 61 (14.5%) were under the mistaken impression that their state
has no shield law." Blasi, supra note 43, at 275-76. At a luncheon for newsroom edi-
tors on Oct. 13, 1976, this author was immediately questioned about what protection
newspersons had in California. First, it was clear that few, if any, of the newspersons
present had actually read either the entire Farr or Rosato decision. Second, the news-
persons present were still intensely interested in the discussion of these cases and pos-
sible solutions to their problem.
144. These and the following attitudes surfaced in interviews conducted by the
author in the summer and fall of 1976 and in the spring of 1977. Eighteen interviews
were conducted during this period. Interviewees were carefully selected with the aid
of Dick Fogel, Director of Communications for the California State Bar. Mr. Fogel
was formerly managing editor of the Oakland Tribune and chairman of the California
Freedom of Information Committee, which represents the state's working press. It in-
cludes, among others, Sigma Delta Chi (the professional journalism society), the Cali-
fornia Newspaper Publishers Association, and the California Broadcasters Association.
A. PICKERELL & M. LIPMAN, THE COURTS AND THE NEWS MEDIA 70 (1974) [herein-
after cited as BENCHMARK]. The interviewees included, among others, William Farr,
Mark Hurwitz (Farr's attorney), Judge Arthur Alarcon, Judge Harry Low, J. Hart Clin-
ton (lawyer, publisher and chairman of the State Bar Committee to Confer with the
Media, which helped lead to the formation of the Statewide Bench/Bar/Media Com-
mittee), and Fresno Bee newsmen George Gruner, William Patterson, and Jim Bort. A
complete list of those interviewed cannot be furnished because some of the interviewees
preferred to speak off the record.
145. Gruner interview, supra note 102; Interview with William Patterson, Fresno
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with the judiciary when, after engaging in the balancing process, it
determines that such orders are necessary. Many may be strongly
influenced by Justice Douglas' dissent in Branzburg and adhere to the
position that freedom of the press is absolute. 146  Although an abso-
lute privilege does not exist, many newspersons are unclear about the
parameters of the privilege that remain after Branzburg.
Even when the interest being weighed against freedom of the
press is a fair trial, newspersons marshal their arguments. One ex-
pert expressed his concern about any limitation on trial coverage and
stated:
The only way that I see our court system can maintain public
confidence, prevent corruption and avoid the possibility of totali-
tarian takeover is through open procedures which include full and
contemporaneous disclosure.
Any other course invites destruction of liberties our courts are
meant to preserve.1 47
In those circumstances in which prejudicing a jury may be a
genuine problem, newspersons argue that alternatives less restrictive
than gag orders are available which ensure a fair criminal trial but
avoid infringement on freedom of the press.148  J. Hart Clinton, a
lawyer and editor of the San Mateo Times commented, "In perhaps
ninety-six percent of all cases there is no pretrial prejudice to defend-
ants by publication if the jury is properly instructed or sequestered
or if changes in venue are granted. 49
According to one reporter, television may have greatly escalated
the free press-fair trial controversy by making it more difficult to give
Bee reporter, in Fresno, Ca. (July 20, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Patterson interview];
Interview with Jim Bort, Fresno Bee city editor, in Fresno (July 20, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Bort interview]; Farr interview, supra note 88; Interview with Dick Fogel, Di-
rector of Communications of the California State Bar, in San Francisco (August 9,
1976) [hereinafter cited as Fogel interview].
146. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 711 (1972). See Hearings on H.R. 215,
supra note 46, at 94 (views of the Reporters Committee advocating an absolute priv-
ilege for newspersons within the first amendment). But see Hearings on H.R. 215, supra
note 46, at 107 (support by the American Association of Newspaper Publishers for a
qualified statutory privilege). The American Association of Newspaper Publishers is
composed of approximately 1,130 daily newspapers (more than 90% of total daily and
Sunday circulation). Id.
147. Fogel interview, supra note 145.
148. Protective orders are widely criticized. Gruner interview, supra note 102;
Patterson interview, supra note 145; Bort interview, supra note 145; Fogel interview,
supra note 145.
149. Interview with J. Hart Clinton, lawyer and publisher of the San Mateo Times,
in San Mateo, Ca. (Aug. 9, 1976). Clinton's comments refer to the joint declaration.
See notes 200-11 & accompanying text infra. He was most active in the drafting and
endorsement of these guidelines.
a defendant a fair trial following news coverage. 150 A newspaper re-
porter declared, "T.V. is where newspapers were fifty years ago in
dealing with sensational news."'151 Reporters and editors of newspa-
pers who were interviewed agreed that sensational newspaper articles
do not sell papers. 152  One reporter claimed that one of the reasons
for the press' conflict with the courts was that by the time a newspaper
prints a story, television has carried the same story on one or more
of its numerous daily broadcasts.'5 3  The result may be that newspa-
pers in an effort to compete effectively and remain economically viable
are now increasing their investigative reporting efforts to give in-depth
analyses not offered by television. The number of confidential sources
needed for such stories is therefore increasing. This increase in con-
fidential sources may have affected press-bench relations by increasing
the number of reporters heavily involved in the use of such sources
and consequently the number of cases before the bench.
When the interest counterbalanced against freedom of the press
is a public body's need for information in a criminal investigation,' 54
the criticisms and solutions offered by newspersons are different, One
newsman believed that he was being asked to function as an in.0estiga-
tor for or an arm of the police, which he vehemently stated he would
not do. 155 Other newspersons argue that the police should be satis-
fied because they are acquiring information from the reporters' stories
which would not otherwise be available. They caution that if re-
porters cannot and do not protect confidential sources both reporters
and police will suffer when the sources dry up. 56 In contrast, once
a reporter resists a subpoena, especially at the price of spending time
in jail, his sources may actually increase. Farr maintained in an in-
terview that his sources have not dried up as a result of his troubles,
and, in fact, he claims there have been sources who will reveal infor-
mation only to him because he would go to jail rather than break a
pledge of confidentiality. 157  Farr also stated that he now carefully
considers each pledge of confidentiality that he makes.158  The deter-
rent effect on news gathering is evident. If fewer pledges of confi-
dentiality are given, fewer confidential revelations vital to important
150. Interview with Gene Blake, Los Angeles Times reporter, in Los Angeles (July
22, 1976), [hereinafter cited as Blake interview].
151. Id.
152. Gruner interview, supra note 102; Bort interview, supra note 145; Blake inter-
view, supra note 150.
153. Blake interview, supra note 150.
154. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
155. Bort interview, supra note 145.
156. Gruner interview, supra note 102; Patterson interview, supra note 145.
157. Farr interview, supra note 88.
158. Id.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
November 19771 NEWSPERSON'S PRIVILEGE IN CALIFORNIA 397
stories will occur. Moreover, if newspersons follow their code of
ethics' 59 and go to jail rather than reveal confidential sources, the in-
vestigating body will then have failed to acquire the information it
sought.' Its purposes will not have been served, but some potential
news sources may have been lost. To newspersons, the cost is dis-
proportionate to any potential benefit, especially in those cases in
which newspersons allege that the issuance of a subpoena is only a
fishing expedition.160
After articulating their criticisms, the newspersons interviewed
offered their perceptions of the causes of the present controversy. In-
terestingly, none mentioned the increased number and importance of
investigative reports.' 0 ' Instead, the responses dealt with subjective
criteria. Some of the interviewees believed that press criticism of
the bench and law enforcement agencies breeds resentment that finds
expression in confrontations with the press. 62  Some newspersons may
be mistrustful of attorneys as a group, including the judges and pros-
ecuting attorneys involved in the issuance of subpoenas, perhaps in
part because they feel under attack by attorneys who charge that
newspersons deal in sensationalism for profit.0 3
Another subjective factor mentioned was whether society's ques-
tioning of its basic institutions has been carried over to create conflicts
over freedom of the press. 164  One lawyer placed some blame for the
current lack of regard for the media on the Nixon administration and
its efforts to disgrace the press. 65 This attitude, according to some
interviewees, may have begun with the civil rights movement, 166 Viet-
159. The Code of Ethics of the American Newspaper Guild includes the following:
"[N]ewspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential
information in court or before other judicial or investigating bodies." Reprinted in G.
Brm & F. MERviN, The Press and Society 592 (1951), and BF.cCmAnK, supra note 144,
at 90.
160. Fogel interview, supra note 145; Gruner interview, supra note 102; Bort inter-
view, supra note 145.
161. See Blasi, supra note 43, at 252.
162. Bort interview, supra note 145; Patterson interview, supra note 145. Fresno
Bee editor Gruner commented that the court was acting like a "bulldog" in forcing this
confrontation with the press. Gruner interview, supra note 102.
163. Blake interview, supra note 150. Interview with Roger Tartarian, former ed-
itor, United Press International and presently professor of journalism at Cal. State at
Fresno, in Fresno, Ca. (July 20, 1976).
164. Interview with Roger Tartarian, former editor United Press International and
presently professor of journalism at Cal. State at Fresno, in Fresno, Ca. (July 20, 1976);
Interview with unnamed broadcast newsman (see note 144 supra); Interview with un-
named counsel for major daily newspaper (see note 144 supra).
165. Interview with Mark Hurwitz, attorney for William Farr, in Los Angeles (July
22, 1976).
166. Interview with unnamed broadcast'newsman (see note 144 supra).
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nam, 61 the Sheppard v. Maxwell decision, 68 or the Reardon Report. 169
Another theory expressed was that reporters are merely involved in
the movement growing out of an increased awareness of individual
rights.17 0
In sum, those newspersons interviewed seemed to believe strongly
that their role in society is fully to inform the public and that they
are significantly aided in achieving this goal by the use of confidential
sources. The courts and the public investigative bodies, in their view,
hinder their efforts effectively to serve the public. Although contempt
citations, costs of litigation, and jail sentences may make newspersons
think twice before promising confidentiality, once the promise has been
given, newspersons assert that they will go to jail with a sincere belief
that what they are doing is professionally sound and expected. 171
The Bench
The judiciary's responsibility is to protect all rights guaranteed
under the Constitution, including both the first amendment right of
the public to receive information and the sixth amendment right of a
defendant to a fair trial. The bench must weigh these constitutional
rights against each other if it finds that a defendant's fair trial is jeop-
ardized by the free flow of information. Judges have considered the
right to a fair trial ascendant. In one judge's opinion delaying public
access to information is not harmful if on balance the release of the
information preserves a defendant's right to a fair trial.Y12  This view
clashes with the attitude of the press that very seldom, if ever, should
information be kept from the public.
A survey was recently conducted in California to determine how
superior court judges regard the problem of prejudicial pretrial and
trial publicity. 173  The survey concluded that most judges did not or
167. Interview with Mark Hurwitz, attorney for William Farr, in Los Angeles (July
22, 1976). See Blasi, supra note 43, at 254, for press feelings of mistreatment by the
Nixon Administration and general disillusionment with the government after Vietnam.
168. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
169. Interview with unnamed counsel for major daily newspaper (see note 144
supra). See note 199 & accompanying text, infra.
170. Interview with unnamed broadcast newsman (see note 144 supra); Interview
with unnamed counsel for major daily newspaper (see note 144 supra).
171. Farr interview, supra note 88; Gruner interview, supra note 102; Patterson in-
terview, supra note 145; Bort interview, supra note 145.
172. Interview with Judge Arthur Alarcon, Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
in Los Angeles (July 27, 1976), [hereinafter cited as Alarcon interview]; Interview
with unnamed federal district court judge (see note 144 supra). See Kirtz, Courts v.
Press: 'War of the Words,' Jumus DoCTOR, Feb. 1977, at 29.
173. Note, Judicial Control of Pretrial and Trial Publicity: A Reexamination of the
Applicable Constitutional Standards, 6 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 101, 133-37 (1975). The
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would not include the media in their decision to issue a restrictive
order.17 4  Importantly, the survey indicated a lack of uniformity in
the standards used by the judges deciding to issue such an order. 175
Perhaps one reason for the reluctance of judges to include the
press in judicial decisions affecting publication of information about
a trial is a perception of judicial responsibility to ensure fair trials as
nondelegable. It also appears that some judges may have an un-
derlying suspicion of the activities and motives of the press in news
gathering. One judge claimed that the media had lashed out unfairly
at judges. 76  Another judge stressed that some newspersons deserve
public mistrust or scorn often present in our society. 77  His view is
that the press must examine its own actions and must ensure ethical
and correct reporting to the public. To him, the newsperson's code
of ethics has little impact because newspersons who are ethical do
not need it and those who are unethical will not apply it. In his
opinion the code of ethics represents a pure business decision by the
press reflecting that if sources are disclosed they will dry up. 7 8
The survey's second finding, the lack of uniform standards, brought
into focus an area of concern. 179  Uniform standards need to be de-
veloped for the issuance of restrictive orders to provide guidance to
judges who seek it, to inform the press and public so that suspicions
of arbitrariness are allayed, and to preclude abuse. For example, one
judge emphasized that protective orders are not intended as devices
for covering up judicial mistakes.'80 One attempt toward definite
standards has been instituted by a group of California judges. The
project, called Hotline, 18 employs seven judges who, because of their
expert knowledge of the legal consequences of the issuance of gag
orders, may be called by judges throughout the state when they con-
template issuing a restrictive order.'8 2  Judge Arthur Alarcon, one of
survey was sent to 250 superior court judges in ten California counties. Twenty-three
judges completed the questionnaire. Id. at 133.
174. Id. at 135.
175. Id. at 136.
176. Alarcon interview, supra note 172.
177. Interview with Judge Harry Low, San Francisco Superior Court, in San Fran-
cisco (May 18, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Low interview].
178. Id.
179. Note, Judicial Control of Pretrial and Trial Publicity: A Reexamination of the
Applicable Constitutional Standards, 6 Cor.DE GATE L. REv. 101, 133-37 (1975).
180. Alarcon interview, supra note 172.
181. The Judges on Hotline are: Hon. Arthur Alarcon, Los Angeles Superior Court;
Hon. Donald R. Fretz, Merced Superior Court; Hon. Richard Schauer, Los Angeles Su-
perior Court; Hon. Richard E. Amason, Martinez Superior Court; Hon. Ellis Randall,
Fairfield Superior Court; Hon. Richard Hanscom, San Diego Superior Court and Hon.
Harry Low, San Francisco Superior Court.
182. Fogel interview, supra note 145.
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the seven members of Hotline, weighs the following factors in deciding
to issue a restrictive order: (1) Is the story one of continuing public
interest or does the newspaper or media account consist of only a few
stories? (2) What is the nature of the crime? For example, is there
great public concern or animosity towards the defendant? (3) Is the
defendant someone of great prominence or notoriety who will excite
continuing public interest? (4) Is the victim such a person? (5) Is
the nature of the publicity hostile to the defendant either in the man-
ner in which the story was reported, in the content, or in the tone
of editorial comment? 183  The answers to these questions, designed
to aid judges unfamiliar with the issuance of such orders, articulate
the factors which should be weighed in determining the need for a
restrictive order.
Judge Alarcon emphasized that no order should be issued unless
the court intends to enforce it, but he added, "Judges are under a
compulsion to take appropriate measures to protect a defendant's
rights."'8 4  In his opinion, this judicial responsibility cannot ethically
or constitutionally be avoided. He believes that reporters have con-
spired with persons subject to the courts' protective orders to reveal
information in derogation of criminal defendants' rights.'8s As an
example, Judge Alarcon described an inaccurate story which was pub-
lished in California concerning the Chowchilla kidnap case. 186 Two
brothers had allegedly kidnapped a busload of school children and
buried them in a quarry to prevent discovery. The children eventually
escaped unharmed. Although a restrictive order had been issued,'87
a deputy sheriff released a detailed story describing how the police
stormed the quarry and found the children half buried. " 8  Judge
Alarcon stated, "The public does not need to know each detail. They
should know that the victims escaped and were unharmed."' 8 9  He
believed the story as printed would be highly prejudicial to the alleged
kidnappers.10°
183. Alarcon interview, supra note 172.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Alarcon interview, supra note 172. See 26 Children Saved from Kidnapers,
Los Angeles Times, July 17, 1976, pt. I, at 1, col. 5.
187. People v. Woods, No. 63187 (Alameda Co. Super. Ct., Nov. 15, 1976). The
restrictive order was filed on Nov. 15, 1976, but there are attempts presently to modify
it.
188. Alarcon interview, supra note 172.
189. Id.
190. Id. The viewpoint that accurate reporting might actually have helped the
accused was expressed by the Madera County sheriff. He discounted all prior press
stories that any of the alleged kidnappers in the Chowchilla case were involved in drug,
gun, or devil cults. With reference to the protective order, he continued, "This is one
of the reasons I think it is unfortunate that our free press is prohibited by court order
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However, even Hotline does not answer the need for definitive
guidelines. With only seven judges as Hotline personnel there is still
variance in how these seven approach the issuance of restrictive orders.
Another member of Hotline, Superior Court Judge Harry Low, em-
phasized the need for judges to find other alternatives to restrictive
orders, such as careful questioning during voir dire, granting a con-
tinuance, sequestering the jury, granting a change of venue, or ad-
monishing the jury.191 As an overriding concern, he emphasized the
courts' "duty to deal firmly with advocates who choose to conduct their
litigation in the press instead of the courtroom."'192  If a restrictive
order is necessary, in his or her opinion, a judge should seek to make
the order as narrow and limited in time as possible.'93 Judge Low
noted that in 1976 the Judges' Association urged all new justices to
work closely with the press and to consider carefully the issuance of
restrictive orders.1 4
Judge Low said that it seemed ironic to him for the judiciary to
be accused of infringing first amendment rights when historically the
judiciary has been a great protector of such rights, greater even than
the legislative or executive branches. In his view the courts' role will
be less atypical if the press and bench work together to reach accom-
modations for and solutions to the differences that occur. 9 5 He stated
his belief that the differences between the judiciary and bench are not
insurmountable and therefore can be resolved with effort on the part
of both groups. 90
Growing out of the friction between the press and judiciary have
been recent joint efforts by the bench, bar, and media to resolve dif-
ferences and avoid confrontation. 97 One promising vehicle for co-
from printing the facts as we have gathered them. Sometimes the facts are less dam-
aging than the surmises." S.F. Chronicle, Aug. 3, 1976, at 2, col. 1.
191. Low interview, supra note 177.
192. Address by Judge Harry Low to the California Newspaper Publishers Associa-
tion, A Panel Discussion of Restrictive Orders and Shield Laws (Dec. 3, 1976) (author's
files).
193. Id.
194. Id. The Judges Association presented a panel before 125 new judges at a two
week Trial Judges College.
195. Id.
196. Low interview, supra note 177.
197. Examples of meetings held jointly by the bench, bar, and media are: (1)
Southern Cal. Conference on the Media and the Law, sponsored by the Ford Founda-
tion, in Santa Barbara (Feb. 11-13, 1977); (2) Foundation for American Communica-
tions, discussion of ethics, news sources and terrorism, in San Francisco (Mar. 5-7,
1977); (3) Workshop for the Media, sponsored by the Cal. Judges Ass'n and the Western
Newspaper Foundation, at U.C. Berkeley (Sept. 9-10, 1976); (4) The Recorder and
the Courts: Rights and Restraints, sponsored by the Cal. judges Ass'n, at U.C. Berkeley
(May 1, 1976); (5) An Exploratory Discussion of Restrictive Orders and Shield Legis-
lation, at the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Cal., in Fresno (Sept. 18-22, 1976);
operation has been the Statewide Bench/Bar/Media Committee, 198
which was formed in 1970, subsequent to the American Bar Associa-
tion's adoption of the Reardon Report.199 This committee composed
a set of guidelines entitled the Joint Declaration Regarding News
Coverage of Criminal Proceedings in California.200 These guidelines
concerning news coverage in criminal trials, were an outgrowth of the
violent media reaction to the Reardon Report.20' The Reardon Report
had advocated restrictive orders in criminal proceedings in which they
were deemed appropriate. 20 2  The media criticized the Reardon Re-
port as inflexible in its placing restraints upon the press. The press
noted that seldom is publicity prejudicial, and the public's right to
know should not be restricted because of isolated instances of preju-
dicial publicity.203 The joint declaration's response was not to advo-
cate restrictive orders but to emphasize the responsibility of the bench,
bar, and media in assuring both the sixth amendment rights of a fair
trial and the first amendment rights of a free press. This formulation
of principles by the committee emphasized "high professional ethics"
(6) Editors Conference of the Cal. Newspapers Ass'n, on pervasive coverage of criminal
cases and press ethics, in Palo Alto (June 17, 1977).
198. The Statewide Bench/Bar/Media Committee is composed of representatives of
the State Bar Committee to Confer with the Media, the California Freedom of Informa-
tion Committee, California Newspaper Publishers Association, California Broadcasters
Association, Radio and TV News Directors, and the Executive Board of the Conference
of California Judges (now known as the California Association of Judges). The Judi-
cial Council of the State of California did not join but participated in the formulation.
Letter from J. Hart Clinton of the Committee to Confer with the Media to the State
Bar of California (Mar. 24, 1977) (on file at State Bar of California, San Francisco)
[hereinafter cited as Clinton letter of 1977].
199. Reardon, The Fair Trial - Free Press Standards, 54 A.B.A.J. 343, 347-48 (1968).
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), led to a series of efforts by various com-
mittees to resolve the problems of pretrial and trial publicity. The best known of these
studies is the Reardon Report, adopted by the American Bar Association Advisory Com-
mittee on Fair Trial and Free Press. This report recommended restrictions not only
upon lawyers but also upon the press and law enforcement officers. Another prominent
study was the Kaufman Report, dealing with parties and witnesses during judicial pro-
ceedings. See Report of the Comm. on the Operation of the Jury System of the Judicial
Conference of the United States on the "Free Press - Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391
(1969), as amended, 51 F.R.D. 135 (1970). See Note, Gag Orders on Criminal De-
fendants, 27 HASTINcS L.J. 1369, 1386-98 (1976); Comment, Gagging the Press in Crim-
inal Trials, 10 HA.nv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 608, 618-25 (1975). See also Fair Trial and
the Free Press (1968) (published debate between Paul Reardon and Clifton Daniel
sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research).
200. 45 CAL. ST. B.J. 170 (1970).
201. BENCHMARK, supra note 144, at 66.
202. See Reardon, The Fair Trial - Free Press Standards, 54 A.B.A.J. 343 (1968).
203. BENCHMARK, supra note 144, at 67-68. The press prefers other alternatives,
such as change of venue or sequestering the jury. Clinton letter of 1977, supra note
198, at 1.
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which should produce fair trials "without limiting freedom of the
press."20 4  Local committees were established state-wide 20 5 to act as
a forum to encourage discussion. 20 6
The joint declaration was endorsed by the California Bar and
prominent media groups in 1970.207 Although the joint declaration
is not binding on the press, attorneys, or judges, its adoption by the
major bench, bar, and media groups was significant mainly because
for the first time these groups began jointly to discuss and attack diffi-
cult common problems. 20 8  In April 1977, the Board of Governors of
the California State Bar reaffirmed support for the joint declaration in
preference to the American Bar Association's Recommended Court
Procedure to Accommodate Rights of Fair Trial and Free Press. The
newer guidelines were adopted in response to suggestions by the media
that the Reardon Report would be better received by the press if the
media was allowed to be involved in the issuing of restrictive orders.
The new American Bar Association's guidelines were designed to give
the press a court procedure to protest restrictive orders.2 00  However,
the Reardon Report even with these changes is still heavily criticized
by the media..210  Perhaps the best endorsement of the Statewide
Bench/Bar/Media Committee concept is the American Bar Associa-
tion's announcement on March 16, 1977, that it has formed a joint
task force with the American Newspaper Publishers Association, which
is similar to the one now existing in California.211
It would appear that any resolution of the conflict between the
press and the courts would involve compromise by both groups. Less
204. The first paragraph of the joint declaration states: "The bench, bar, and news
media of California recognize that freedom of the press and the right to a fair trial, as
guaranteed by the First and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States,
sometimes appear to be in conflict. They believe, however, that if the principles of
fair trial and free press are applied responsibly in accord with high professional ethics,
our society can have fair trials without limiting freedom of the press." 45 CAL. ST. B.J.
170 (emphasis added).
205. Bench/Bar/Media Committees exist in the following counties: Marin, San Fran-
cisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, Riverside, San Bernar-
dino and Fresno. According to Clinton, the Fresno Committee was not formed until
after the jailing of the Fresno Bee newsmen because of "the unwillingness of the leading
newspaper in Fresno to participate in the work of such a committee." Clinton letter
of 1977, supra note 198, at 4.
206. Id. at 3.
207. BENCHMAUC, supra note 144, at 70.
208. Clinton letter of 1977, supra note 198, at 3-4.
209. Id. at 5-6.
210. Id. Furthermore, it was believed that an adoption of these guidelines by the
California State Bar would undo the "constructive work" which had taken place since
1970. Id.
211. Id. at 8.
suspicion and more cooperation by such means as inclusion of the
press in judicial decisions concerning the issuance of restrictive orders
seems advisable. Furthermore, it is necessary for the bench and the
press to continue the Bench/Bar/Media Committee to discuss and
perhaps resolve problems before crises develop. As these groups be-
come better known and utilized, they could serve as forums not only
for discussion but also for resolution of problems.
Resolution by a Federal Shield Law
Federal shield legislation has been hotly debated in both the
United States Senate and House of Representatives, particularly since
the Branzburg decision. 212  No bill has yet mustered enough support
to be voted out of committee. Without the passage of a uniform law
on the federal level, if a California newsperson steps outside the state,
the protection provided could have many variations as different courts
interpret Branzburg's limitation upon the first amendment. The pos-
sibility of newspersons needing to be familiar with judicial interpre-
tations of the twenty-five existing shield laws 213 or suffering the
consequences is a legitimate problem because newspersons are quite
transient, especially those involved in investigative reporting.2 14
Resolution by a federal statute has advantages other than uni-
formity. The statute could eliminate the confusion that has been the
residue of the Branzburg decision. Most importantly, forcing news-
persons to reveal confidential sources in what approaches an undefined
panoply of situations chills the news flow and erodes an important
freedom under the federal Constitution. A twofold solution which
will afford greater protection for newspersons while simultaneously
creating nationwide uniformity appears appropriate.
Hence, this Note will urge adoption of a federal shield bill, which,
although similar to one recently introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives,2 1" has been modified to provide greater protection for news-
212. See Note, Reporter's Privilege - Guardian of the People's Right to Know?, 11
NEw ENGL. L. REV. 405, 415-16 nn.51, 52 & 55 (1976).
213. See note 16 supra.
214. For example, in the Branzburg companion case, Caldwell was a New York Times
reporter working in California. 408 U.S. 665, 675 (1972). Pappas, in the other com-
panion case, was a reporter for a Massachusetts television station working out of Provi-
dence, Rhode Island. Id. at 672.
215. H.R. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Its pertinent provisions are as follows:
SEC. 2. As used in this Act -
(1) the term "newsman" means any man or woman who is a reporter, photog-
rapher, editor, commentator, journalist, correspondent, announcer, or other individual
(including partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity existing under or
authorized by the laws of the United States or any State) engaged in obtaining, writing,
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persons and yet avoid conflict with recent California decisions. It is
federal legislation that appears to have the support of those members
of the media who will accept less than an absolute privilege. 216  As
reviewing, editing, or otherwise preparing information in any form for any medium of
communication to the public ....
SEC. 3. Except as qualified by sections 4 and 7 of this Act, in any Federal or
State proceeding (including a grand jury or pretrial proceeding), no individual called
to testify or provide other information (by subpoena or otherwise) shall be required
to disclose information or the identity of a source of information received or obtained
by him in his capacity as a newsman.
SEC. 4. At the trial of any civil or criminal action in any court of the United
States (as defined in section 6001(4) of title 18, United States Code) or of any State,
a newsman may be required to disclose the identity of a source of information or any
other information if -
(1) the identity or information was not received or obtained by him in express
or implied confidence in his capacity as a newsman, or
(2) the court finds that the party seeking the identity or information has estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence -
(A) that disclosure of such identity or information is indispensable to the
establishment of the offense charged, the cause of the action pleaded, or the defense
interposed in such action;
(B) that such identity or information cannot be obtained by alternative
means; and
(C) that there is a compelling and over-riding public interest in requiring
disclosure of the identity or the information.
SEC. 5(a) Any order of a court of the United States or of any State granting,
modifying, or refusing a claim of privilege on the part of a newsman shall be subject
to judicial review and shall be stayed by the issuing court for a reasonable time to
permit judicial review ....
"(5) Orders of such district courts or the judges thereof granting, modifying,
or refusing a claim of a newsman's privilege of nondisclosure. [sic] Such appeals shall
be given preference and expedited and shall be heard at the earliest practicable date."
SEC. 6. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to impair or preempt the enact-
ment or application of any State law which secures the minimum privileges established
by this Act....
H.R. 215 is considered dead by its sponsor. Telephone interview with staff member
of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 23, 1976).
216. For example, this bill had the support of the American Newspaper Publishers
Association, which stated: "It appears to us that it is nonproductive to take the position
that it would be better to have no bill than a 'qualified bill.' Our reasons for stating
this are pragmatic. The Supreme Court decision in Branzburg was actually established
by an 8 to 1 vote rather than a 5 to 4 vote in terms of the position of 'all or nothing' under
the First Amendment.... We believe that H.R. 215 does better than the dissent and
comes closer to the libertarian position than did Justice Stewart and his two colleagues."
Hearings on H.R. 215, supra note 46, at 108. However, a different view was expressed by
Jack Nelson of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press who stated: "Because
we have faith that the Congress wishes to protect an [sin] encourage first amendment
guarantees, we believe that the Congress should pass an absolute and preemptive priv-
ilege statute, protecting journalists from being ordered to disclose unpublished informa-
tion before any executive, legislative, or judicial body of Federal, State, or local govern-
ment.
a threshold matter, any proposed federal shield law should have the
support of a united press because division within the press has resulted
in numerous bills lacking the support to leave committee. 217  As an
illustration of how the proposed qualified privilege 218 would operate,
the provisions of the suggested legislation will be applied to the fact
situations in Farr v. Superior Court,219 Rosato v. Superior Court,220 and
Lewis v. United States.221
Provisions of Federal Shield Legislation
A federal shield law is needed that would provide: (1) quali-
fied protection for newspersons using a broad definition of the term
"newsperson," (2) qualified protection in civil and criminal settings
in all judicial, legislative and administrative proceedings, (3) an ab-
solute privilege for grand jury hearings, (4) a clearly stated set of
requirements, culminating in a definitive, yet flexible balancing test
to determine the applicability of a newsperson's privilege, (5) clari-
fication of what constitutes waiver of the privilege, and (6) expedited
judicial review after the privilege has been denied. 222  Such a bill
would give newspersons in California and throughout the country
greater protection than is currently available. In addition, when
newspersons make decisions regarding the collection and use of in-
formation obtained from confidential sources, they could rely upon
the uniform though flexible provisions of the statute.
Protection under the statute should extend to any person or "legal
"We strongly oppose any limitation on this privilege." Id. at 94. The Reporters
Committee made clear in its testimony that it thought there was an absolute privilege
inherent in the first amendment. The Committee noted that in the lower courts re-
porters have had success in quashing subpoenas, and expressed concern that congres-
sional legislation would curtail the absolute privilege. Id. at 95.
This same concern was expressed in this author's interviews with newspersons.
Bort interview, supra note 145; Fogel interview, supra note 145.
217. Telephone interview with Murray Flander, press aide to Senator Alan Cranston
in Washington, D.C. (June 15, 1976).
218. The terms "qualified" and "absolute" may vary greatly when used to describe
particular legislation. Not only can each qualified privilege bill be quite different from
another similarly labeled bill, but absolute privilege bills may vary greatly. The terms
are really a misnomer according to Professor Anthony Amsterdam of Stanford University.
He added that the term "qualified" is "unfortunate because qualification is a matter of
degree, and not of kind." Senate Hearings, supra note 46, at 198-200.
219. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (2d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1011 (1972). See notes 65-96 & accompanying text supra.
220. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (5th Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 912 (1976). See notes 97-116 & accompanying text supra.
221. 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975). See notes 127-41 & accompanying text supra.
222. See note 215 supra.
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entity" that gathers or disseminates news through any news medium.22 3
This general definition would be preferable to a definition by a specific
list because all news disseminators should be included on the face of
the statute to preclude uncertainty in the minds of newspersons and
hearing officers as to whether protection has been afforded under the
law. Thus those involved in circulating underground newspapers or
releases would be included, not just the so-called "journalism establish-
ment." The addition of the term "legal entity" would signal the in-
clusion of partnerships, corporations, and associations whose function
parallels that of a newsperson.
The newsperson's privilege should extend to any federal or state
legislative or administrative proceeding in which a newsperson is sub-
poenaed or called upon to testify. The Daniel Schorr case was an
illustration of this problem. In 1976 Columbia Broadcasting System
reporter, Daniel Schorr, was to be brought before the Ethics Commit-
tee of the House of Representatives for leaking material concerning
committee investigations. Relying on the first amendment, Schorr
made it clear that he would not testify at such hearings, and the
committee eventually decided not to call him.224 The possibility of
such a confrontation in the legislature highlights the need to include
administrative proceedings in any shield legislation.225
The bill should also include an absolute privilege for grand jury
proceedings. In these proceedings there is only a small possibility
of evidentiary gain but a large probability that newspersons, because
of their depth of convictions, will go to jail rather than reveal a
source.220  The unstructured, partisan nature of the grand jury leaves
223. See S. 870, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1973).
224. Daniel Schorr made available to the Village Voice a copy of a draft report of
the House Special Committee on Intelligence. The paper published portions which
dealt in large part with operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. The House
Ethics Committee voted to subpoena Schorr. He refused to reveal his source and based
his refusal on the first amendment. The Ethics Committee voted nine to one against
a recommendation that the House prosecute Schorr on a misdeameanor or contempt
charge. There was much criticism of the entire Schorr investigation because the Ethics
Committee reportedly spent $150,000 in seeking to discover Schorr's sources. See,
Schorr Faces Hill Subpoena, Wash. Post, Aug. 26, 1976, at A-1, col. 1; Editorial, The
Wrong Subpoena, Wash. Post, Sept. 3, 1976, at A-26, col. 1; Editorial, First Amend-
inent Showdown, Wash. Evening Star, Aug. 27, 1976, at A-6, col. 1; Schorr Defies House
on Revealing Source, S.F. Chronicle, Sept. 16, 1976, at 9, col 1; Editorial, The Ethics
Committee's Show, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1976, at A-20, col. 1; Editorial, The House
and the First Amendment, Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1976, at A-14, col. 1.
225. Senator Cranston's press aide indicated that the Schorr confrontation might
bring the newspersons' privilege problem to the forefront of public attention. However,
because Schorr was never cited for contempt, the issue has apparently died on capitol
hill until the next crisis. Telephone interview with Murray Flander, press aide to
Senator Alan Cranston, in Washington, D.C., (June 15, 1976).
226. Senate Hearings, supra note 46, at 142 (testimony of Vincent Blasi).
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a qualified privilege open to abuse.2 27 Furthermore, an absolute privi-
lege would not abridge the sixth amendment right to a fair trial in
this context. 228  Although any absolute privilege in the shield law
would legislatively overturn the Branzburg decision, a close reading
of the majority opinion discloses that Justice White did not state that
news gathering is unprotected by the first amendment2 29 or that press
subpoenas do not inhibit news flow.23 0  If Congress considered broader
evidence than that before the court in Branzburg concerning the in-
hibition of news flow, it could justifiably reach the opposite result on
the constitutional issue in relation to grand jury proceedings. 231
The bill should be applicable to both federal and state proceed-
ings. Bases that have been advanced for application of a federal stat-
ute to the states include the commerce clause, 232 the first amendment
made applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment, 2 33 and
the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause and its
attendant enforcement clause.23 4  The bill should not preempt any
stronger state statutes or judicial interpretations of state constitutions
that would provide a broader privilege. 235
For civil and criminal trials, contempt proceedings, or posttrial
proceedings, the party who asserts the privilege should not be required
to show that no express or implied confidentiality was present or that
(1) the information or source is indispensable to the case, (2) the
information is unavailable from other sources, and (3) there is a com-
pelling and overriding public interest in requiring disclosure. 231'  Un-
227. Id.
228. Hearing on H.R. 717, supra note 17, at 35 (testimony of Benno Schmitt).
229. See 408 U.S. at 707-08.
230. See id. at 693.
231. Senate Hearings, supra note 46, at 205 (testimony of Anthony Amsterdam).
232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause gives Congress plenary
power to protect interstate commerce from state action that inhibits such commerce.
The first amendment would justify a federal shield law if Congress found that the states
are impeding the flow of news, which warrants protection under this provision. See,
e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). Senate Hearings, supra
note 46, at 203-05 (testimony of Anthony Amsterdam).
233. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-
46 (1879); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966). Assuming that the first
amendment protection are among the fundamental liberties protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Congress may prevent impairment of such
liberties by appropriate legislation. Senate Hearings, supra note 46, at 205 (testimony
of Anthony Amsterdam).
234. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. If the first amendment rights were considered
to be among the privileges and immunities protected by the fourteenth amendment,
Congress could rely upon the enforcement clause to prohibit the states from interfering
with this privilege. Newsman's Privilege, supra note 3, at 188.
235. See H.R. 215 § 6, supra note 215.
236. See H.R. 215 § 4, supra note 215.
[Vol. 29
November 1977] NEWSPERSON'S PRIVILEGE IN CALIFORNIA 409
less the newsperson obtains the information in a manner indicating
a pledge of confidentiality, no privilege would attach. The alternative
requirements ensure that the newsperson's information is needed and
unavailable elsewhere, and allow the court to engage in a balancing
test if the first two requirements are met. The inclusion of the bal-
ancing test would avoid constitutional problems with the fifth and
sixth amendment guarantees of fair trial and due process in trial and
posttrial proceedings because the court would be allowed to weigh
these competing interests against the need to maintain a news flow
to the public.
The assertion of confidentiality by a newsperson should suffice
unless the circumstances bring the implied confidentiality into ques-
tion. In effect, there would be a rebuttable presumption that the
information a newsperson received was with an express or implied
promise of confidentiality. This presumption would place the burden
on the party desiring the information to show that the information was
not received in confidence. This allocation of the burden is necessary
because in proving confidentiality, newspersons could jeopardize their
sources' identities by revealing the manner or place of receipt of the
information.237
A failure by the prosecutor to meet the threshold burden that
the information was not received in express or implied confidentiality
would necessitate satisfying each of the three elements of the alterna-
tive test by clear and convincing evidence. This showing would be
required to ensure that the information or source is necessary to
establish the offense charged.
The first prong of the alternative test in the proposed shield bill
is needed to protect the newsperson's promise of confidentiality if the
information is not actually necessary. The second prong is needed
in the event that a source would volunteer the information if ques-
tioned by a court. The third prong, calling for compelling and over-
riding public interest in disclosure is desirable because the test weighs
the relevant first amendment rights and other competing interests.
It provides the court essential flexibility for dealing with constitutional
guarantees and avoids constitutional abridgements.
In California, by contrast, in Rosato v. Superior Court,238 a case
involving a restrictive order, the appellate court held that the balancing
of the competing interests occurred when the hearing was ordered.2 39
This federal shield law would provide for another balancing process
237. See Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 233, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427,
461 (5th Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
238. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (5th Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 912 (1976).
239. Id. at 215 n.13, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
to take place during the hearing on contempt charges. The news-
person could attempt to prove that the preeminent public interest lay
in allowing publication of information despite a restrictive order. The
court would have the opportunity to utilize additional evidence in re-
weighing the competing interests. Because the balancing test would
be utilized, constitutional problems should not arise. The court can
conclude that the publication prejudiced a defendant's right to a fair
trial or interfered with the judicial process. Under such circumstances
the court could require a newsperson to reveal the source.
Furthermore, a qualified federal shield bill should include a waiver
provision which would clarify when and if newspersons have waived
the privilege under the bill. Merely "disclosing any of the information
protected by the privilege to any tribunal, to the public, or to any
other person"240 should not constitute a waiver. The inclusion of a
waiver provision would avoid the confusion presented in Farr v. Su-
perior Court.2 41 Under the proposed shield bill no waiver of the
qualified privilege would have occurred in Farr.
Moreover, a federal shield bill should provide for speedy judicial
review so that a newsperson's source will not be jeopardized while
the newsperson's appeal is pending.242  To force a newsperson to
choose between going to jail and revealing a source prior to appellate
review would defeat the purpose of the federal shield law and, in a
broader sense our judicial system.
The proposed shield law would be opposed by those who believe
the first amendment guarantees an absolute privilege.243  The Su-
preme Court decision in Branzburg exemplifies the Court's rejection
of this argument and the well established rule that the first amendment
guarantee of a free press is not absolute. 2 "4  These critics should not
not rely upon any anticipated change in the Supreme Court's posi-
tion.2 45  Those who favor absolute protection would do well to lend
their support to a qualified privilege.
Application of the Proposed Shield Law
An application of the qualifying sections of the proposed federal
shield law to the Farr, Rosato, and Lewis factual situations illustrates
the protection that would result. In Farr, the court had issued a
restrictive order which covered the potential testimony that Farr pub-
lished prior to trial. Farr later testified at a hearing to determine who
240. Hearings on H.R. 717, supra note 17, at 133 (testimony of Vincent Blasi).
241. See note 91 & accompanying text supra.
242. See H.R. 215 § 5, supra note 215.
243. See note 216 supra.
244. 408 U.S. at 682-83.
245. Hearings on H.R. 215, supra note 46, at 108.
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had leaked the information that he had received the testimony from
two attorneys of record, although all attorneys of record denied under
oath having given Farr this material.246  Under the proposed shield
law, Farr could claim the qualified privilege and invoke the delineated
tests.
The threshold issue in applying the proposed federal shield law
would be whether the news source was expressly or impliedly promised
confidentiality. Although the prosecution could argue that no con-
fidentiality existed because all attorneys of record publicly testified
that they released Farr from any promise of confidentiality, Farr could
still claim confidentiality because any attorney who had not publicly
released Farr would have pinpointed himself as the reporter's source. 247
Such releases, if accepted by the courts, would defeat the purpose of
the shield legislation. Therefore, in Farr, the prosecution could not
have met its burden of proving that no confidentiality had been at
least impliedly promised.
The court would next determine whether Farr's disclosure would
be indispensable to the court's attempt to discover which court officers
had violated its orders. Because all attorneys Qf record had testified
they were not Farr's source, the court would likely conclude that no
alternative means were available to obtain this information.
The third and determining factor in the Farr situation would be
whether, in weighing the competing considerations, there existed a
compelling and overriding public interest requiring disclosure. Be-
cause the jury was sequestered,248 it is questionable whether a fair
trial was jeopardized and, therefore, whether this interest should be-
come part of the equation. The court could weigh the interest in the
sanctity of court proceedings, however, and determine that there was
a compelling and overriding public interest in ensuring that a co'urt's
protective orders are not violated by those subject to them. In view
of the emphasis in the Farr opinion upon the duty of the court to
ensure compliance with its orders and upon Farr's inability to show a
strong public interest in the story, the Farr decision would probably
not be affected under the proposed shield law.
A changed result under the proposed legislation seems probable
in Rosato v. Superior Court..24 9  The bill would have given the Fresno
newsmen the additional protection they desired. The proposed fed-
eral shield law would provide only a qualified privilege in hearings to
246. See notes 67-73 & accompanying text supra.
247. Telephone interview with Mark Hurwitz, attorney for Farr, in Los Angeles
(June 1, 1977). Mr. Hurwitz stated that Far's sources told him to ignore their public
releases of confidentiality before the court.
248. Id.
249. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (5th Dist.
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determine if a court officer has violated a court order. In Rosato, the
newsmen published material which was part of a sealed transcript.
Nonetheless, there was no evidence that the source of the story was
subject to the court order. In fact, the reporters specifically testified
that no court officer was involved.250  Furthermore, the court had
failed to eliminate all the persons who served the court and had access
to the transcript as sources for the story.251
First, it is assumed that the Fresno newsmen, like Farr, would
claim that an express promise of confidentiality was given to the
source(s). The burden would be on the prosecution to show no con-
fidentiality existed. Second, under these facts, alternative means by
which the court might determine whether the court order had been
violated by an officer of the court had not been exhausted. The pos-
sibility exists that even after all sources were questioned, there might
be no suspect who was a court officer or employee. The Rosato court
stated that even if all alternative sources had been questioned without
finding who leaked the grand jury transcript, this impasse would not
have ended the inquiry because the court is not compelled to believe
witnesses. 252 Under the proposed federal shield law, the court must
exclude all alternative sources. Once the interrogation of the sources
has been completed, the court would apply the third test to determine
whether there exists a compelling and overriding interest in compelling
the reporter to reveal the information. In Rosato, the newsmen were
faced with possible graft by a sitting public official. The newsmen
had determined that because the information was not different from
that published before the grand jury began its proceedings and because
the councilman was continuing in his official capacity and planning to
take part in scheduled city council hearings, such information should
be made known to the public..253 In this case, the Fresno Bee news-
men assumed the judicial role of weighing the competing interests.
However, it is ultimately the responsibility of the courts to make this
determination and if newspersons propel themselves into this role, their
actions will be subject to judicial review, as in Rosato.
Under the proposed federal shield law, a court could consider
the public interest in full disclosure of the political activities of an
elected representative who is continuing in office notwithstanding dam-
aging testimony against the official at a grand jury hearing. As in the
Farr case, the court could find that there is an overriding and com-
pelling interest in discovering who disobeyed the court order. In
1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
250. See notes 99-109 & accompanying text supra.
251. Id. at 239, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 465 (Franson, J. concurring and dissenting).
252. Id. at 235, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
253. Id. at 239, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
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Rosato, the court officers and the newsmen had denied that the order
was violated by someone covered by the order. If the court suspects
perjury, an investigation should be conducted through the district
attorney's office. 25 4  The court could evaluate the need for sealing the
transcript, the court's interest in discovering who violated the order,
and the public desire generally to maintain a free flow of information
and specifically to be informed about possible graft by a sitting city
official. Under these facts it appears that the prosecution could not
have shown by clear and convincing evidence that the information
should not have been disclosed to the public. The proposed federal
shield law would require a reversal of the Rosato holding.
In Lewis v. United States,2 5 the proposed federal shield law
would have given Lewis absolute protection from the subpoena issued
by the grand jury investigating the bombing.2 56 The proposed shield
law's operation will be illustrated by hypothesizing that Lewis had
been called, not by a grand jury, but rather to testify and produce
evidence at the trial of the alleged bombers. Lewis would then be
able to claim only a qualified privilege not to testify. Lewis had
previously received several communiques from underground organiza-
tions who engaged in criminal terrorist activities. 257  He refused to
produce for a grand jury the original of a communique from one such
group which claimed responsibility for a bombing.25 Although there
was no express assurance of confidentiality, Lewis could argue that
because he had previously acted as a conduit and refused to release
original communiques, these groups had given him the information,
assuming confidentiality. Under these facts it is likely that this
claim would be recognized as an instance of implied confidentiality.
If his claim was not accepted by the court, he would have to reveal
his source because confidentiality is necessary for the newsperson's
privilege to attach.
Under the proposed test the government in Lewis would next
have to show that this original communique was indispensable to the
offense charged and that there was no alternative source for this in-
formation. Although there may have been sufficient evidence for a
grand jury indictment against the terrorist group, the government
could show that the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt 25 9 at the trial would necessitate the release of Lewis' informa-
254. Id. at 235, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
255. 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975).
256. See text accompanying note 226 supra.
257. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
258. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
259. Carrado v. United States, 210 F.2d 712, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 1018 (1954). See also United States v. Silverthorne, 400 F.2d 627, 634 (9th
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tion. The government's increased burden of proof in criminal trials
could justify a holding by the court that the original communique was
indispensable to the government's case. Furthermore, because Lewis
was the only person to receive the communique, there would be no
alternative source for the information. A central question remains as
to whether there would be a compelling and overriding public interest
in requiring disclosure. The government could assert that this factual
situation falls within the purview of Branzburg 0° because Lewis pos-
sessed information concerning a crime. Therefore, the compelling and
overriding public interest in this case would favor disclosure of the
information. Arguably, Lewis could advance a different public in-
terest. He could assert that the public will have greater exposure
to otherwise inaccessible information if confidential sources are not
dried up. The group benefiting from this greater access would include
law enforcement officials because Lewis did relinquish copies of the
communique to them, thereby providing them with information to
help solve the crime that they would not otherwise have received.
It seems unlikely, particularly in light of Branzburg, that Lewis' argu-
ment would prevail. If use of the original communique could help
the authorities stop those persons who planned or executed public
bombings, then the public interest would lie with prevention of such
crimes.
Conclusion
The application of the proposed federal shield legislation to re-
cently decided cases illustrates that such a law would provide greater
protection for newspersons than presently exists without interfering
with the competing interests of a fair trial and due process. A news-
person called before a grand jury, legislative hearing, or administrative
hearing will be allowed to refuse to appear or testify. In a criminal
or civil trial or contempt proceedings, the party who asserts that no
privilege should attach to the newsperson will have to show that no
implied or express confidentiality exists. Failing to prove this lack
of confidentiality, the party must show that the information is indis-
pensable to his case, that no alternative sources exist and that there
is a compelling and overriding public interest in exposing the source
or information.
The confusion among newspersons caused by differing laws and
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1970); United States v. Reyes, 280 F. Supp.
267, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Kohl, 59 N.J. 471, 479, 284 A.2d
161, 169 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972).
260. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg did not pass on this question but intimated
that the holding would apply to criminal trials as well as grand juries. Id. at 690-91.
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novel judicial interpretations should not be allowed to continue. The
desired protection would emanate from a single law with its single set
of requirements and standards. A qualified federal shield law must
allow the competing interests to be weighed and articulated carefully
by the court when necessary. Such legislation would be an important
and perhaps vital ingredient in dispelling the present mistrust between
the bench and media by achieving an equitable result.
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